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Setting aside commodities of necessity like food and clothing,
perhaps no other product is as universal and popular as music. It is
no surprise that millions of dollars are spent trying to package and
harness it into a marketable form.1 Perhaps it is that same quality of
J.D., Candidate, UCLA School of Law, 2009; B.A., English, Brigham Young
University, 2006. Special thanks to Robert Reynolds, my brother and manager for The
Killers, for teaching me the ropes of the industry and believing in this cause, to Gary
Stiffelman for his amazing music law course, and to Curt Hessler for motivating me to
write this article. Winner of The GRAMMY Foundation's 10th Annual Entertainment Law
Initiative Writing Competition.
See, e.g., Warner Music Group Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 53-54
1.
(Nov. 29, 2007) (reporting cost of revenues in the amount of $1.8 billion and selling,
general, and administrative expenses in the amount of $1.1 billion).
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universality, its "primal nature," that makes music such an
untamable and unruly beast these days. The question of how to sell
music effectively (and for some, whether or not it should be sold in the
first place) is one that has been hashed and rehashed by those inside
and outside of the industry. 2 While the plausible solutions currently
being employed or contemplated have not, as of yet, struck gold, or
even silver (maybe iTunes deserves bronze credentials), they have told
us some valuable things about the state of the American music
consumer. Perhaps we have not recognized just how valuable this
information really is.
Instead of jumping straight to an answer of "what model
works," we need to recognize that this market, like any other, is
controlled by the consumer, not the manufacturer. There are certain
expectations that music-lovers have adopted, and they will not easily
be divorced from them. What is required is not a top-down approach
in which the industry sets the standard for what they will offer the
customer and expect them to be satisfied, but rather a bottom-up
approach where we consider what customer demands are and try to
accommodate them in a fashion that is monetarily feasible. This may
sound daunting, but winning back customers is exactly what the
industry has to do if it wants to combat the losses to piracy.
By "surveying" some of the models tested or proposed for
solving the industry's woes and gleaning from their successes and
failures what they teach us about music consumers, we can begin to
create a framework in which a new model should and must operate to
succeed. As this framework emerges, this article will argue for what
is currently the most feasible model for both meeting consumer
demands and pumping money into a flailing industry: the socialization
of music.
I. DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT

The "unlocking" of the iPhone by teenager George Hotz was one
more reminder that hackers will always be two steps ahead of
technology. 3 For every new digital lock there are 1,000 nerds ready for
their moment in the spotlight. From blacking out CDs with magic
markers to using programs like "ourTunes" and "myTunes" to
download songs from iTunes users, end-runs around Digital Rights
2.
See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF
BUSINESS Is SELLING LESS OF MORE 27-40 (2006) (describing the evolution and decline of
the hit record as a business model).

3.

Brad Stone, With Software and Soldering, AT&T's Lock on iPhone Is Undone,

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at C1.
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Management (DRM) continue to sprout up. But there is a moral to
this musical dilemma: people want to own their music. Consumers
will not be satisfied with a model that does not allow them to listen to
and use their music as they like. The recent surge in sales for
AmazonMP3 demonstrates this principle. By offering music DRM-free
(and for a slightly cheaper price), in a matter of months, Amazon has
4
quickly risen to become one of the largest online music retailers.
Apparently noting the increasing demand for unprotected music,
iTunes recently released a catalogue of DRM-free tracks from EMI
and have likewise gained an up-tick in sales. 5 Thus, the failings of
DRM give us the first piece of our new business model framework: (1)
People want uninhibitedownership of their music.
II. RIAA LAWSUITS
An early attempt at stopping the wave of online file sharing
took the form of a more proactive and "American" approach.
Following the old mantra "if you can't beat them, sue them," in
December 1999, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) began an aggressive campaign to litigate infringers out of the
picture. 6 With the continuing disaggregation of the world of piracy,
lawsuits against Web sites that encourage piracy, and more recently
the individual infringers themselves, have become more and more
costly and difficult to win. The way in which the lawsuits have
affected the attitudes of consumers is perhaps more frustrating for the
industry. While some argue that lawsuits are turning the tide,
convincing more and more people that stealing music really is
"wrong," the surge in piracy over the last several years proves
7
otherwise.
This does not bode well for industry executives. It is not that
they are not "in the right," it is just that being in the right does not
mean anything in the world of marketing. It is all about doing what is
best, and what is best is either making a lot of money off the lawsuits

4.
Posting of Jeff Reguilon & Alan Wiley to Amazon Earworm's Blog,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/blog/postfPLNK1GR94T4PJ38D6 (Sept. 25, 2007, 15:04 PDT).

5.

Max Brenn, iThnes Is the Second Largest Music Retailer in U.S., NPD Says,

EFLUXMEDIA,

Feb. 26,

2008, http://www.efluxmedia.com/newsiTunesIsThe_Second_

LargestMusicRetailerInUSNPDSaysj14495.html
6.

See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: 4 YEARS LATER,

http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa at-four.pdf (Aug. 2007).
7.
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, In the Heated Fight Over Music Piracy, a Rare Stand for
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2007, at All ("In the past four years, record companies have
sued tens of thousands of people for violating the copyright laws by sharing music on the
Internet.").
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(which we all know is not happening), or using the lawsuits effectively
to persuade people to stop pirating. Currently, the suits are not
widespread enough to scare many people. In fact, the percentage of
people citing the risk of prosecution as a deterrent against illegal
downloading has dropped a full nine percent in just the last year.8
Furthermore, since the lawsuits are not profitable, it is impractical for
the RIAA to try and expand their scope. But most importantly, the
lawsuits still are not convincing people that copying music is morally
equivalent to stealing. Until an alternative emerges that customers
feel gives them a fair shake, this is unlikely to change. Perhaps there
is a broader principle supporting this concept. In a democracy like
America, law is created by the majority. If most Americans are
sharing music or believe sharing music should be considered legal,
then perhaps it should be legal. But for now, we have learned
something else: (2) A few lawsuits cannot change the widespread
public perception of what the law should be.

III. "360" RECORD DEALS
Some of the financial troubles in the music industry are
reflected in a growing public perception that record labels are cheating
their artists out of money. 9 Whether or not this is a correct
observation, it is certainly an understandable one. As record sales
fall, labels have been trying to find alternate ways to get more bang
for the buck from their artists by pressuring them to give up more
rights. 10 Traditional recording agreements are quickly being replaced
by what are known as "360" deals.'1 The concept behind these deals is
that in order to balance the increasingly unprofitable financial risk of
investing in artists, the labels needs to have access to other more

ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA RESEARCH, THE 2007 DIGITAL MUSIC SURVEY 77 (July
8.
http://www.entertainmentmediaresearch.com/reports/EMRDigital-MusicSurvey
2007),
2007.pdf.
See Edna Gundersen, Bye, Bye, a Piece of the Pie, USA TODAY, May 17, 2004, at
9.
1D ("The record business abounds with tragic lore of music pioneers cheated out of
earnings by predatory managers and labels.").
10.
See Ben Cardew, From a Stream to a River: The Rise of the Multi-Platform
Deal, MUSIC WK., June 16, 2007, at 4 (noting that, because "physical music sales are
down," 'labels are starting to experiment with deals that stretch beyond the traditional
model of recorded music").
11.
See Jeff Leeds, The New Deal: Band as Brand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, § 2,
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lucrative aspects of their careers. 12 For artists, this means giving up
13
some of their touring revenues-the major source of their income.
Unanimous adoption of "360" deals will lead to catastrophic
problems if it continues unabated. By shifting their focus to touring
revenues, the labels essentially are conceding that they can no longer
make money selling music. The inevitable result of such an admission
is to begin signing artists based on their ability to make money
touring. Artists who traditionally have sold tons of records (but who
do not make much money touring) will be replaced by others who
might produce terrible records but have a knack for entertaining
crowds. On a broader scale, signing bands based on their touring
revenues would mean giving up on entire genres of music that do not
focus on live performances, but nonetheless are an important part of
our musical landscape.
Instead of specifically compensating musicians for the music
they create, "360" deals essentially take money from the artist's left
pocket and move it to their right one. Money that an artist would
otherwise make through touring is rerouted to their label and
returned through advances that previously were based on music sales.
This money shifting amounts to an eventual musical suicide,
providing unhealthy incentives for songwriters and musicians that
will lead to a creative deficit in the next generation of albums. As
such, the "360" deal is not a solution-it is surrender. If the industry
wants to keep selling records, it will have to refocus its efforts on
helping artists earn money from the music they make-not just the
way they perform it. This adds one more piece to our puzzle: (3) The
health of our creative landscape relies on directly rewardingartists for
the music they create.
IV. SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES

The subscription service business model is not new to the
industry, but has lately been gathering steam as an option that holds
greater potential. 14 The basic concept behind most variations of this
model is that the consumers pay a monthly fee that grants them
access to listen to (usually) unlimited music while they are

12.
See id. (noting that a "360" deal is "one in which artists share not just revenue
from their album sales but concert, merchandise and other earnings with their label in
exchange for more comprehensive career support").
13.
See id.
See U.S. Teens Dropping Out of CD Market, CBC NEWS, Feb. 27, 2008
14.
("Twenty-nine million Americans acquired digital music legally, via pay-to-download sites
[in 2007], which is an increase of five million over [2006].").
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subscribers. 15 The early test runs for this model have had less than

remarkable success, but recent proposed alterations to it have pumped
new life into the concept. 16
Subscription models that allow users to "keep" the music they
download are too costly to attract customers.17 When users are
granted unlimited downloads, there is nothing to stop them from
enrolling for a month, loading up on music, and then canceling their
subscription. Because of this, most companies that pursue this model
stream their music instead of allowing permanent downloads' 8-and
therein lies the root of this model's problems. The first consequence of
stream-only downloads is a restriction on when and where people can
listen to their music. Any subscription that does not permit customers
to listen to their music at home, in the car, at work, or wherever they
please, is destined to fail. There must be a way to access the music
anywhere, or the service will be worthless to today's iPod-dependent
consumer. Until wireless internet is available nationwide, there are
no feasible ways to provide this access in a stream-only service. One
more piece of the framework: (4) People want their music to be
portable.
To sidestep this complication, one approach is to allow users to
keep the music they download, but to also attach digital "tethers" to
the files. These tethers allow the music to be transferred to a portable
device and played anywhere the customer wants. 19 However, when
the subscription is not renewed, the tethers are "pulled," which
20
disables the music from all the devices where it has been stored.
This model ignores the fact that music-lovers are deeply attached to
their music; the possibility of losing it is, for many, a deal-breaker.
What happens if you are dissatisfied with your service and want to
change to another company? What if the company goes belly-up? Will
15.

For example, RealNetworks offers access to over 4 million songs through

Rhapsody for a monthly fee of $12.99. Rhapsody-Premium Subscription Music Service,
http://www.real.comlrhapsody (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
16.
See JupiterResearch Says Digital Transmission Well Underway, but Digital
Sales not Enough To Save Music Industry, BUS. WIRE, March 3, 2008.
But see Adam Benzine, Comes With Music Comes of Age After Nokia Deal,
17.
MUSIC WK., Dec. 15, 2007, at 2 (describing Universal's new music subscription service in
which the customers can "keep all the music they have downloaded when the year-long
subscription ends").
See Rhapsody-Premium Subscription Music Service, supra note 15.
18.
See Rene A. Guzman, The Owner's Manual, Internet Music File Limits Loosen,
19.
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 22, 2007, at 3J ("DRM restricts content usage according
to the copyright holder with specially programmed limitations, such as the ability to play
on certain devices.").
See Eric Gwinn, Jury Still Out on Amazon's Challenge to iTunes, CHI. TRIB.,
20.
Oct. 2, 2007, at C4.
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you lose everything and have to start from scratch? Some suggest
that the company could keep your "playlist" on file in case you decide
to discontinue the service, thus allowing you to regain access to your
music should you decide to rejoin in the future. However, this
introduces a host of other problems. As your playlist grows over time,
the personal cost of stopping your subscription or switching to another
service would get higher. Because leaving the service means losing all
of your music, the company retains unethical leverage over the
consumer and can inflate its prices. Music consumers will not stand
in line to sign up for a subscription service that will bind them. (5)
People want their music to have permanence.
V. RAISING THE PRICE OF MUSIC

Trying to charge more and more money for music will not
compensate for the losses in the industry. It will drive more people to
piracy. People have changed. They no longer connect to music and
artists the way they used to. 21 They eat up music in gulps and
handfuls, consuming it more than ever before. They want to buy in
bulk, and that calls for lower prices. Keeping in mind that we are
competing with "free" pirated music, cheaper will have to be the
answer. Let us add two final parts to the framework: (6) People want
a lot of music; and (7) People are not willing to pay what they used to
for music.
VI. FINDING A WORKABLE SOLUTION

Even with this framework in place, there may still be questions
as to whether there is anything the industry could provide that would
draw people away from piracy and back to paying for music. And yet,
there is still a market gap between what people get through piracy
and what they could get for money. Here are some of the reasons that
people will still turn to a viable music business model:
1. P2P services and pirate sites hold high risks of infecting your computer with a
virus.
2. Many music consumers find non-commercial music sources confusing and
difficult, choosing instead to have their more tech-savvy friends copy music for
them. A simpler, iTunes-style alternative would have appeal.
3. Paid sites have more potential to offer features that appeal to music lovers, such
as the iTunes "You might also like" feature. Music lovers like getting direction.

21.

See ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 33-35 (discussing the formation of "400 Top

40s" and the "micro-hit," both of which can be attributed to playlist sharing).
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4. Despite what the RIAA and various labels may claim, people do, in fact, still
have consciences. While the allure of free music currently overrides the fear and
guilt of illegally downloading music for many Americans, it does not mean they
would not look forward to an appealing legal alternative.
5. Fans want to see their favorite artists rewarded for their efforts.

So with this market gap in mind, and the framework set up in
which we must operate, we must now determine a model that fits
within the realities discussed above. If the new business model is to
push consumers past the "tipping point," it will need to be a shove, not
a prod.
It will need to be grand and sweeping.
Because the
capitalistic model for music has imploded on itself, I believe music
should be socialized. However, how would such a system work?
The first question to be addressed is: where will the money
come from? The best way to accumulate a lot of money quickly
without burdening anyone excessively is a blanket tax on all
Americans. When put in context, a music tax is not a radical concept.
In essence, it is like being a patron to the arts. New taxes often
accompany
technological
changes
that require
government
involvement. Some cities are already beginning to provide Wi-Fi
coverage for their citizens through taxation, 22 and some nations, such
as England, have a television tax.2 3 In addition, Americans have
always paid for things that they may or may not use in their lifetime
(e.g., welfare). This would not be the first time the government has
needed to step in and regulate the technological battlefield of digital
music. From the enactment of the Copyright Act to the codification of
the DMCA, there have been several pivotal moments in the life of our
rapidly evolving techno-sphere in which government intervention was
the best alternative to deal with new issues.
Music distribution will have to begin with an authorized DRMfree release of all albums by the labels to the government. Any labels
that choose not to do so would be welcome to withhold, but they would
lose out on the royalties that would be accrued by taxpayers (or
subscribers) through the music tax. While music could be distributed
and tracked through a government-legitimatized P2P site, policing it
would be difficult. The government would have to track downloads in

22.
See Olga Kharif, Why Wi-Fi Networks Are Floundering;Faced with Weak User
Demand, AT&T and Other Telecoms Are Stepping Up Pressure on Cities To Foot More of
the
Bill for Muni
Wi-Fi Projects, BUS.
WK. ONLINE,
Aug.
16,
2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2007/tc20070814-929868.htm;
Paul
Korzeniowski, Municipal WiFi Networks Popping Up All Over, TECHNEWSWORLD, Aug. 29,
2006, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/52561.html?welcome=1205080455.
23.
See BBC, Key Facts: The TV Licence Fee, http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/
keyfacts/stories/licencefee.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
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order to pay out correct royalty amounts to artists, and a P2P system
could potentially be gamed by people to show higher royalties for an
artist than he or she deserves by setting up computers that cycle the
same download from different IP addresses.
A better model would be similar to an iTunes format. The
government could either set up a central server to host the music or
license the right to outside parties who could generate advertising
revenues on their Web site to pay for it. This would encourage the
greatest innovation in site organization.
Determining royalties
through random sampling or on a per-play basis would be too
inaccurate and problematic to discuss here, but a per-download basis
should work. If each taxpayer (or subscriber) were to log into the site
with an account they created, the songs they download could be
tracked. The incentive to download from anywhere else would be
greatly diminished with the release of an authorized copy. The
authorized copies could be watermarked so that any songs copied from
one person to another would still be "tracked" and credited to the
artist when the new owner logs onto his own account with the
government-run service and it syncs with his computer.
Our survey of business models has churned out a laundry list
of industry guidelines that is daunting by any standard. However,
ignoring these points will inevitably fail to reverse the industry's
decline. Because the labels will need to join forces in providing an
attractive alternative to piracy, any approach that delivers these
criteria is going to require some form of government intervention.
While a jump to complete socialization may seem like a frightening
one, it is the only idea that incorporates all of the consumer demands
identified above and that would not rely on risky investments that
could permanently cripple the already malnourished music business.
In many ways, socializing the industry would be a return to the roots
of music; perhaps music was always intended to be a completely
communal experience.
By supporting our artists (and those who promote them)
through a national music tax, our nation would be able to embrace
emerging file sharing technologies fully and foster creativity
universally. Music lovers would enjoy unfettered access to and
enjoyment of their favorite songs, and the artists producing the best
music would still be rewarded. No new "miracle" technology is
required-just a shift in mindset. Most importantly, this is what the
people want. If the industry can meet consumer demands while
replenishing its falling sales revenues, everyone wins. As Cherry Lane
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Digital CEO Jim Griffin so aptly stated, "Music well done is
anarchy, and it is better we should monetize that anarchy than

continue to vainly attempt to end

''
it. 24

24.
See Posting of Bob to The Lefsetz Letter, http://lefsetz.com/wordpress/index.php
/archives/2007/09/26/more-stiffelman/ (Sept. 26, 2007).

